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Abstract
A physician performs two tasks: making diagnoses and determining treat-
ments. To reduce medical error, residents are supposed to consult their su-
pervisors when they face uncommon circumstances. However, recent research
shows that residents are reluctant to do so. This paper presents a model that
explains (i) which residents shy away from consulting; (ii) when residents are
reluctant; (iii) the importance of protocols in the medical sector; and (iv)
when consulting is a sign of strength or a sign of weakness. Furthermore, I
show that encouraging residents to consult by investigating mishaps leads to
another distortion: residents will give too much weight to own assessments.
Keywords: Medical error, medical decision-making, reputational concerns,
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1 Introduction
Suppose you go to a hospital because you have felt ill for a couple of days. A medical
resident examines you thoroughly and diagnoses that you su¤er from a rare, exotic
disease. He proposes a heavy treatment that may lead to problems of infections
and depressions. How would you react? As the disease is rare and the treatment is
heavy, it is likely that you want the resident to ask a more senior physician to look
at you. Before undergoing the heavy treatment, you want the residents diagnosis
to be conrmed.
For many diagnoses it makes sense to ask for a second opinion. The reason is
twofold. First, between 44,000 and 90,000 Americans die every year as a result of
medical error (Kohn et al., 2000). Diagnosis error is identied as a major source of
medical error (Britto and Pamnarayan, 2009). Diagnosis error varies across special-
izations. Research on second opinion reports percentages of discrepancies between
diagnoses in the range of 4% to 50% (for an overview see Schi¤ et al., 2005). Some-
times the second opinion leads to major changes in treatment. For example, for
cancer diagnosis in head and neck, 24% of the changed diagnoses involved a change
from a benign to a malignant diagnosis, 15% involved a change from a malignant
to a benign diagnosis, and 61% involved a change in tumor classication (Westra et
al., 2002). Hahm et al. (2001) report similar gures for liver pathology.
The second reason to ask for a second opinion is that physicians themselves are
reluctant to consult other physicians in case of uncertainty. This typically applies to
residents. Most hospitals have protocols describing the circumstances under which
residents should call the attending physician. However, there is strong evidence
that residents do not always follow protocols (Sutcli¤e et al. 2004). According to
Williams et al. (2007) residents reluctance can be explained by the hierarchical
nature of the relationship between the residents and the attending physicians. For
the advancement of their study, in particular, and for their career perspectives, in
general, residents want to make themselves look good in the eyes of their superiors.
Fear for negative feedback discourages residents to consult (Sutcli¤e, et al. 2004).
The job of a physician consists of two parts. Making a diagnosis and, on the
basis of this diagnosis, determining the treatment.1 When a job consists of two
1Many other jobs also consist of two parts. Consider a book publisher. Part of his job is to
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parts, it often raises a matching problem: Doing the job properly requires a good
assessment. One way of reducing the probability of incorrect assessments is to allow
workers who are uncertain about their assessments to consult more senior workers.
Indeed, Garicano (2000) shows that a hierarchy is a natural way to organize the
acquisition of knowledge for solving matching problems. The idea is that when
an agent faces an uncommon situation he turns to a more senior agent for help or
advice. In the case of an hospital, when a resident is uncertain about his diagnosis he
should consult an attending physician. Obviously, this way of organizing matching
problems requires that residents have proper incentives to consult their superiors.
The main objective of the present paper is to investigate those incentives.
Above I have discussed evidence that residents sometimes refrain from consulting
in situations where they should do so. It is worth emphasizing that this behaviour is
not limited to the medical sector. The business literature on feedback-seeking sheds
light on the factors that inuence employeesconsulting behavior in other working
places [for a survey of this literature see Ashford et al. (2003)]. Loosely speaking,
in this literature an agent is said to seek feedback when after he has performed
(part of) a job, he asks another agent, often a superior, whether or not he is on the
right track.2 The business literature distinguishes two motives that drive consulting
behavior: the instrumental motive and the image-based motive. In this paper we
argue that these motives also underlie consulting behavior in the medical sector.
The instrumental motive is the point of departure of Section 2. The idea is that
a resident seeks feedback to better select the proper treatment for his patient. I
show that (i) more uncertainty leads to more consulting; (ii) a resident should call
the attending physician if his diagnosis suggests a relatively extreme situation; and
(iii) highly able residents seek conrmation from their superiors out of fear of being
wrong, whereas less able residents seek feedback out of fear of being right.3 Section
2 explains why many hospitals use protocols to guide residentsconsulting behavior.
review new manuscripts. On the basis of a review, a decision is made whether or not to publish
the book, and how much money to spend on marketing it. The job of a loan o¢ cer also consists
of two parts. First, he has to determine the creditworthiness of a client and the protability of
an investment plan. After the loan o¢ cer has formed a picture of the loan request, he makes a
proposal for the type of loan.
2We use the words seeking feedback, asking feedback, seeking advice and consulting
interchangably.
3Ashford and Cummings (1985) and Tuckey et al. (2002) provide evidence supporting these
results. The second nding is consistent with Garicano (2000).
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Consulting behavior is also inuenced by how residents believe it a¤ects their
image; that is, how they are seen by their superiors.4 The image motive seems
particularly relevant for knowledge-based hierarchies such as exist in hospitals where
career concerns are, almost by denition, important. Residents are in training.
Attending physicians play an important role in evaluating residents. In Section
3, I present a model in which both the instrumental and the image motive drive
consulting behavior. The model explains why protocols that dictate consulting
behavior do not always work (Roberts, et al. 2008, and Seilverman et al., 2007).
Broadly, the predictions of my model are consistent with the existing evidence on
consulting behavior in other workplaces. Ashford and Northcraft (1992) nd that
fear for negative feedback discourages employees from seeking feedback. On the
other ip of the coin, hope for positive feedback is a stimulus for feedback-seeking
(Brett et al., 1991). Morrison and Bies (1991) nd that the act of seeking feedback
and the content of feedback have separate impacts on employeesimages. Finally,
whether feedback-seeking is a strength or a weakness varies from organization to
organization (Ashford et al., 2003).
Section 3 shows that residents may shy away from consulting to conceal their
shortcomings from the eyes of others. Abstaining from asking advice increases the
likelihood of poor task performance, and may lead to complaints. In Section 4 I
examine whether monitoring through investigation of complaints alleviates the dis-
tortion in residents consulting decisions (see, Prendergast, 2003). In the model,
monitoring means that the attending observes the residents diagnosis and how he
has acted upon it. I show that monitoring weakens the incentives of less able juniors
to distort their consulting decisions. However, monitoring leads to another distor-
tion. It induces residents to give too much weight to their own information. When
more able residents should give more weight to their own assessments than less able
residents, showing condence in your own assessment is a sign of strength. Hence, if
the senior observes how an employees action relates to his assessment, reputational
concerns lead the employee to attribute too high a weight to his own assessment.
The prediction of my model that people tend to overweigh private information is
4In the economics literature, the image motive is referred to as reputational concerns. Holm-
ström (1999) was one of the rst who investigated how reputational concerns can motivate
employees.
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consistent with ndings of social psychologists. Overweighing private information
is regarded as one form of overcondence (see, for example, Healy and Moore, 2007
and Kariv, 2005). In that literature, however, overweighing information is not a
choice. People believe that they use information e¢ ciently. Bernardo and Welch
(2001) explain in such a context why overcondent individuals survive. They argue
that overcondence is a counterforce to herd behavior. In my model, people are not
overcondent in the sense that they truly believe that their information is superior.
Rather, residents act as if their information is superior to impress their supervisors.
This paper is closest related to the literature on herding. Scharfstein and Stein
(1990) show that in a sequential decision-making process reputational concerns may
induce the second player to ignore his private information and to follow the rst
player. The idea is that signals of able agents are correlated. Agreement therefore
signals competence, whereas disagreement signals incompetence (see also Visser and
Swank, 2007). In the realm of the herding literature, Ottaviani and Sorensen (2001)
addresses the question of the order of speaking. A benet of letting the more compe-
tent agent speak rst is that at least the more competent agents signal is revealed.
A benet of letting the less competent agent to speak rst is that that agent has
weaker incentives to herd.
My paper deviates from this literature in several respects. Most importantly,
the model developed in this paper has interesting predictions in the absence of
reputational concerns. It explains why residents should consult their supervisors
under uncommon circumstances. In particular the result that an increase in the
probability that the resident makes a correct diagnosis may increase the scope of
consulting is somewhat surprising. Second, in my model the focus is on the rst
player, while in the herding literature the focus is usually on the second player.
Finally, I do not address the order of play. It is in the nature of the educational
process that at a certain time residents are charged with the responsibility to make
diagnoses and to determine treatments.
2 The Instrumental Motive
Example: dry eye syndrome5
5See Carrol Patton (2009).
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A common eye illness is keraroconjunctivitis, better known as dry eye syndrome.
Physicians try to diagnose dry eye in early stages as treatment options rely on how
severe the disease is. Depending on the perceived stage of the disease, physicians
prescribe specic eye drops. Some drops are prescribed for mild forms of dry eyes,
other drops are prescribed for more advanced forms. Occasionally, physicians insert
silicane plugs. A physician who has to select a treatment faces the problem that the
stage of the disease is hard to diagnose. Tests are often not reliable because eyes
can be hypersensitive at di¤erent stages: "Symptoms do not always correlate with
the stages of disease". As a result, "physicians have to make educated guesses" [Dr.
Karpecki, quoted in Patton (2009)].
Our model describes a two-layer hierarchy. On the rst layer is a junior physician
(one can think of a resident). We refer to this physician as the junior. The junior
meets a new patient. The task of the junior is twofold. First, to make a diagnosis,
and second, to select a treatment. I model the performance of both tasks as follows.
Denote by x the optimal treatment from the patients perspective. This x is drawn
from a distribution function f (x), with
R
x
xf (x) dx =  and
R
x
(x  )2 f (x) dx =
2. The patients preferences are described by
UP =   (e  x)2 (1)
where e denotes the treatment selected by the junior. Equation (1) captures that the
physician should select the treatment that optimally addresses the patients problem.
The way the junior makes a diagnosis is modelled in a crude way. I assume that
the junior receives a signal about x. With probability  this signal, s, is correct,
s = x. With probability 1  , the signal is drawn from f (x), but does not contain
any information about x. The density function f (x) is common knowledge. Before
preceeding, let me briey discuss a well-known illness to which the above way of
diagnosing applies.
If the junior does not consult a more senior physician, his treatment decision
results from maximizing the expected value of (1), conditional on s, with respect to
e, yielding
e = s+ (1  ) (2)
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Equation (2) shows that the treatment is a weighted average of the juniors signal
and the expected value of x. As expected, the higher is , the higher is the weight
the junior attributes to his signal. To reduce notation and without losing any insight
into the consulting problem, I assume that  = 0. One can think of x = 0 as a patient
with a common problem (of course in the context of the realm of the disease, say, dry
eye syndrome). If jsj is large, I say that the juniors diagnosis suggests an extreme
problem. The task requires a treatment that deviates from the standard.
On the second layer is a senior physician. Think of him as the attending physi-
cian. By assumption, this senior makes a correct diagnosis. Consulting her, however,
entails an opportunity cost C. More specically, after the junior has received his
signal, he can learn the true value of x for sure by consulting the senior at a cost
C.6 The juniors consulting decision (d 2 fn; yg, with d = n denoting "not consult-
ing" and d = y denoting "consulting") is the main focus of the present model. The
question I address is for which values of s does the junior consult the senior?
The consulting decision entails a simple cost-benet analysis. Not consulting
yields an expected payo¤ equal to
U (d = n; s) =   [s  s]2   (1  )E [s  x]2
=   (1  ) s2   (1  )2 (3)
where E is the expectation operator. Consulting ensures that the treatment is
tailored to the patients actual problem, e = x. The junior consults the senior if the
expression in (3) is higher than  C:
S (s) =  (1  ) s2 + (1  )2   C > 0 (4)
The function S (s) is a parabola with a minimum at s =  = 0. If C > (1  )2,
then the junior does not consult for values of s close to 0, and consults for values
relatively far from 0. If, by contrast, C  (1  )2, then the junior always consults
the senior. Proposition 1 summarizes the above discussion.
Proposition 1 Suppose that C > (1  )2 and 0 <  < 1. The junior does not
6At the end of this section, I discuss how relaxing the assumption that the senior always makes
the correct diagnosis a¤ects the results.
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consult (d = n) for values of s relatively close to , and consults (d = y) for values
of s relatively far from 0.
Proposition 1 is consistent with the observation discussed in the introduction that
consulting takes place when the resident faces an uncommon patient. An implication
of Proposition 1 is that for C > (1  )2 two values of s exist, for which a junior is
indi¤erent between consulting and not consulting. Because of our assumption that
 = 0, the range of s for which the junior consults can be represented by a single
value s  0: S (s) = S ( s) = 0, where
s =
s
C   (1  )2
 (1  ) (5)
Using (5), one can determine how the juniors inclination to consult depends on the
juniors ability of making a correct diagnosis, .
Proposition 2 For small values of , an increase in  shrinks the range of s for
which the junior does not consult. For high values of (  1
2
being su¢ ciently
high), an increase in  widens the range of s for which the junior does not consult.
To grasp the intuition behind Proposition 2, rst suppose that  is close to zero,
say  = 0:1. Then, the treatment largely depends on  and hardly depends on s
[see (2)]. If the juniors diagnosis is correct, then the selected treatment deviates
much from the patients problem. So, if  is small, the junior runs the danger of
making a correct diagnosis. The higher is , the larger is this danger. Now suppose
that  is close to one, say  = 0:9. In such a situation, the selected treatment
primarily depends on s. For high values of s, an uninformative signal would lead to
a mismatch between the treatment and the patients problem. To put it otherwise,
the junior runs the danger that he has received a wrong signal. To eliminate this
danger, the junior consults the senior for high values of s. Clearly, the higher is ,
the lower is the probability of a mismatch.
So far, I have assumed that the junior makes a diagnosis, decides on the treatment
and decides on whether or not to consult the senior. Another possibility is that the
juniors job description species what he should do, and under which circumstances
he is regarded to consult the senior. Protocols and job descriptions are important
in the medical sector. Consider the following three examples.
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1. c > (1  )2x and  = 0. In this case, the junior is regarded always to follow
the same routine, e = 0, and never to consult the senior. The task of making
a diagnosis does not exist. An example is a nurse who is charged with the task
of vaccinating children against measles. In principle, measles vaccine can lead to
allergic reactions (for example, children having an allergy to eggs may have an
allergic reaction to the MMR vaccination). However, children are rarely subjected to
thorough investigation. The cost of an investigation does not outweigh the expected
benets.
2. c < (1  )2x and  being (very) low. In the second case, making a diagnosis
and acting upon it are two di¤erent jobs. The senior determines what to do, and the
junior performs the treatment. In terms of our model, the junior always consults
the senior. Division of tasks is very common in Dutch orthodontic centres. Usually,
a dentist refers a patient to an orthodontic centre. Next, the orthodontist makes
a diagnosis and proposes an orthodontic appliance (often a kind of brace). The
brace is nally placed by an assistant. Assistants normally do not have an academic
training (low ).
3. c < (1  )2x and  being high. The last example concerns doctors who already
had advanced training (higher ). Residents have some freedom to make diagnoses
and to make decisions on treatments. However, they are supposed to consult a senior
physician under uncommon circumstances and for procedures they cannot perform.
The model presented in this section is the easiest model I could think of to
bring home the point that juniors tend to consult seniors under relatively extreme
circumstances. Moreover, the model clearly demonstrates two reasons why juniors
want to consult. If  is small, then a junior consults because he may have received
a correct signal. If  is high, then a junior runs the danger of having received a
wrong signal. An extreme assumption I made is that the senior always make correct
diagnoses. Relaxing this assumption does not a¤ect the above results qualitatively
either. What matters is that the senior is an additional source of information. For
example, I could have assumed that, if consulted, the senior, like the junior, receives
a signal that is informative with a certain probability. I would have derived the
additional result that the higher is the probability that the seniors signal is correct,
the stronger is the juniors incentive to ask feedback. This result is consistent with
Fedor et al. (1992), who nd that the more credible is the source of information,
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the more likely employees are to seek feedback.
The results presented in the present section are consistent with the literature on
second opinion in surgical pathology. Abt et al. (1995) nd that in 5.8% of the
cases the second opinion was signicantly di¤erent from the initial diagnosis. Hahm
et al. (2001) nd for liver diseases discrepancies in 35% of the cases. In more than
7% the change in diagnosis had a signicant e¤ect on the chosen treatment. Westra
et al. (2002) nd major discrepancy rates between initial and second diagnoses
of 7%. Many of these changes reected a change from a benign to a malignant
tumor. In their eld (beck and head surgery), Westra et al. (2002) recommend a
mandatory second opinion for diagnosis leading to demanding treatments. In other
words, a physician should consult another physician for diagnoses requiring major
treatments.
3 Reputational Concerns
As discussed in the introduction, residents have good reasons to make a good impres-
sion on their supervisors. In this section, I examine how such reputational concerns
a¤ect the residents decision to consult the attending physician. To this end, I as-
sume that there are two types of juniors, j 2 fh; lg, where j = h denotes that the
junior is highly able in making diagnoses, and j = l denotes that the junior is less
able in making diagnoses. Similar to the model of the previous section, with proba-
bility j the signal a junior of type j receives, sj, is correct, sj = x. With probability
1  j, the signal is drawn from f (x), but does not contain any information about
x. I assume that a highly able junior is more likely to make a correct diagnosis than
a less able junior, h > l. A junior knows his own ability. The probability that
a junior is highly able equals . The parameters j and  are common knowledge.
The junior, whether able or less able, wants to come across as able.
The consulting decision (dj) contains information about the juniors ability to
make correct diagnoses because dj depends on j. Throughout this section I assume
that l > 12 . As shown in the previous section, this assumption implies that less able
juniors consult for a wider range of s than more able juniors: sh > sl. Moreover,
I assume that in case the junior consults the senior, the latter learns s and how it
relates to x. Figure 1 depicts how under these assumptions the juniors consulting
10
Figure 1: How do the juniors feedback decision depend on his signal?
decision depends on his ability when he is not concerned with his reputation.
Our model is a game of incomplete information. To solve it, I identify perfect
Bayesian equilibria, in which the strategies of the two types of juniors are best re-
sponses given the posterior probabilities, and the posterior probabilities are updated
according to Bayesrule.
In equilibrium, a junior of type j consults (dj = y) if [see Equation (4)]
Sj (sj) +  [^ (d = y; s; x)  ^ (d = n)]  0 (6)
where ^ (d = y; s; x) denotes the posterior probability that the junior is able, given,
d = y, s and x; and ^ (d = n) is the posterior probability pertaining to the event
that the junior does not consult. Let sj denote the threshold value of sj for which
in equilibrium a junior of type j is indi¤erent between consulting and not consulting
[the left-hand side of (6) equals zero].
Lemma 1 In equilibrium, a less able junior consults for a wider range of signals
than a highly able junior: sh > s

l .
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that sl  sh. An implication
is that for s = [sh; s

l ); ^ (d = y; s; x) = 1. Then, Sh (s

h) =  [^ (d = n)  1] and
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Sl (s

h)   [^ (d = n)  1], so that Sl (sh)  Sh (sh). However, the assumption that
l >
1
2
ensures that Sl (sh) > Sh (s

h). To see this, di¤erentiate (5) with respect to
.
Lemma 1 has a couple of implications for how consulting a¤ects the seniors per-
ception of the juniors ability. First, not consulting improves a juniors reputation:
^ (d = n) =
sh
sh + (1  ) sl
>  (7)
Equation (7) directly follows from Lemma 1. As in equilibrium, highly able juniors
consult less frequently than less able juniors, not consulting increases the posterior
probability that the junior is highly able (relative to the prior). Second, when s lies
in either of two intervals, a less able junior reveals his type by consulting:
^ (d = y; sl < s < s

h; x) = ^ (d = y; sh < s <  sl ; x) = 0 (8)
The reason for this result is that in the specied intervals a highly able junior does
not consult, whereas a less able junior does. Consulting is therefore a clear sign
of being less able. Finally, if s > sh (or s < s

h), then the act of consulting does
not contain information about the juniors type. As h > l, whether or not the
diagnosis is correct does contain information about the juniors ability:
^ (d = y; s <  sh _ s > sh; s = x) =
h
h + (1  )l (9)
^ (d = y; s <  sh _ s > sh; s 6= x) =
(1  h)
(1  h) + (1  ) (1  l) (10)
The expected reputation of a junior of type j when consulting in these cases equals
^ej (d = y; s <  sh _ s > sh)
= j
h
h + (1  )l + (1  j)
(1  h)
(1  h) + (1  ) (1  l) (11)
Notice that the expected reputation of a highly able junior is better than that of a
less able one, as h > l.
With the help of (7-11), I can identify two equilibria of the consulting game.7
7For su¢ cient high values of , an equilibrium exists in which both types of juniors always
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Proposition 3 describes them.
Proposition 3 (A) Suppose that ^eh (d = y; s <  sh _ s > sh)  ^ (d = n). Then,
an equilibrium exists in which
(i) a junior of type l consults if sl  sl > sl, with sl solving
Sl (s

l ) = ^ (d = n) , (12)
(ii) a junior of type h consults if sh  sh > sh, with sh solving
Sh (s

h) =  [^ (d = n)  ^eh (d = y; s <  sh _ s > sh)] , (13)
(iii) a junior of type j chooses e¤ort ej = jsj and
(iv) the posterior probabilities are given by (7-11).
(B) Now suppose that ^eh (s <  sh _ s > sh) > ^ (d = n). Then, an equilibrium
exists in which (i), (iii) and (iv) hold. Moreover, a junior of type h consults if
sh  sh = sh.
The rst part of Proposition 3 describes an equilibrium in which both types of
juniors distort the consulting decision. Reputational concerns induce both types to
abstain from consulting in situations where consulting is desirable. Notice that the
right-hand side of (12) is higher than the right-hand side of (13). This means that
at the margin the drop in reputation resulting from consulting is larger for the less
able junior than for the more able one.
The second part of Proposition 3 describes an equilibrium in which only less able
juniors distort the consulting decision. To understand why a highly able junior does
not necessarily have an incentive to distort, rst notice that
^eh (d = y; s <  sh _ s > sh) > ^ (d = n)
implies that a distortion would go into the direction of more consulting rather than
less consulting. However, for sh just smaller than sh, consulting would make the
consult (sl = s

h = 0) with posteriors probabilities given by (9) and (10), and an out of equilibrium
belief ^ (dj = n) = 0.
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senior believe that the junior is less able.8
Identifying the conditions under which one of the two equilibria described in
Proposition 3 occurs amounts to determining for which parameters consulting yields
a better reputation for the senior than not consulting. One important determinant
is how much h deviates from l. If a highly able junior makes a correct diag-
nosis with a much higher probability than a less able junior, then making a cor-
rect diagnosis is a strong signal of being highly able. As a result the inequality
^eh (d = y; s <  sh _ s > sh) > ^ (d = n) is likely to hold. The same is true for large
values of . I have shown that especially less able juniors have strong incentives to
abstain from consulting. However, the more a less able junior distorts the consulting
decision, the less consulting signals ability. After a certain point, highly able juniors
boost their reputations by consulting instead of abstaining from consulting.
As discussed in the introduction, in the medical sector residents have often been
found reluctant to consult their supervisors out of fear of coming across as ignorant.
More general, several studies report that fear for negative feedback discourages con-
sulting [see the references in the survey by Ashford et al. (2003)]. In my model, less
able juniors expect to damage their images by consulting. Highly able juniors, by
contrast, may enhance their images by consulting. Therefore, reputational concerns
especially make less able juniors more reluctant to consult. However, in spite of this
result, less able juniors keep consulting more frequently than highly able juniors (see
Lemma 1). Morrison and Bies (1991) nd that consulting a¤ects individuals in two
di¤erent ways: by the act of consulting as well as by its content. Basically, (7-11)
tell the same story. Equations (7) and (8) refer to the e¤ect of the act of consulting
on a juniors image, while (9-11) refer to its content.
My model sheds light on the question to what extent consulting is considered
as a sign of strength. I nd that in expectations not consulting improves a juniors
reputation [see (7)]. However, the more important are reputational concerns, the
less abstaining from consulting enhances a juniors reputation (cf. Ashford and
8The equilibrium described by the second part of Proposition 3 is not unique. To see this,
suppose that sh is just below sh and that s

l solves (12). The posterior probabilities corre-
sponding to these strategies are such that a smart agent does not want to deviate [provided
^eh (s <  sh _ s > sh) > ^ (d = n)]. In fact, any pair of strategies, sl solving (12) and sh > s0h
where s0h solves ^
e
h (s <  s0h _ s > s0h) = ^ (d = n)], can be part of an equilibrium. The equilibrium
described in Proposition 3 is the only one in which a smart agent does not distort the feedback
decision.
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Northcraft, 1992). Moreover, the question whether consulting is a weakness or a
strength cannot be isolated from the question of the expected content of consulting.
For a less able junior, not consulting is a strength. It enhances his image. For a
highly able junior, consulting may improve his image (in expected terms).
4 Monitoring by investigation
In the model of Section 3 patients are sometimes treated poorly. In practice, poor
task treatment may lead to complaints. Complaints, in turn, may induce supervisors
to investigate cases in more detail. Indeed, investigation of complaints is a well-
known way of monitoring agents. In the present section, I examine how investigation
of complaints a¤ects consulting behaviour.
More specically, I extend the model of the previous section in the following way.
I assume that if a mismatch between the treatment and the disease occurs and it
exceeds a certain value, jej xj > v , the senior receives a complaint and investigates
the case.9 By investigating the senior learns the juniors diagnosis, the treatment,
and the disease. In the model of the previous sections, a mismatch between the
treatment and the disease could occur for two reasons. The rst reason is that
the agent makes a wrong diagnosis and did not consult the senior. The second
reason is that the junior made the correct diagnosis, but put too little weight to
it: jjsj   sjj > v. By sometimes investigating cases, the senior does not want the
junior to put more weight on his signal (although below I will argue that the junior
does). Rather, she wants the junior consult more often. To focus on the question
how monitoring a¤ects the juniors consulting decision I assume that the highest
(lowest) value x can take equals h ( h), such that jlh   hj < v. This restriction
ensures that if a junior receives a correct signal and acts upon it in line with (2), it
never leads to a complaint. Furthermore, to keep things simple I assume that f (x)
is a uniform distribution function with range 2h.
Before presenting the equilibrium of the present model, it is fruitful to discuss
why the equilibria presented in Proposition 3 do not survive when the senior some-
9In many settings, it is more plausible to assume that the senior may receive a complaint only
if too little e¤ort has been put in the task. Allowing for this asymmetry does not a¤ect the results
qualitatively.
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times monitors. The reason is that introducing monitoring by investigation into the
model turns the model into a signalling game. To see this, suppose that a less able
junior receives a positive signal sl that is close to zero. Then, in the equilibria of
Proposition 3 this junior does not consult the senior, and exerts e¤ort el = lsl.
With some positive probability the senior investigates the case and learns the rela-
tionship between el and sl. From this relationship she infers that the junior is of the
less able type. By contrast, if the senior were to learn that eh = hsh, she would
infer that the agent is highly able. The implication is that a less able junior has an
incentive to mimic a highly able junior. He can do so by attributing a high weight
to his signal (el = hsl). The other ip of the coin is that a highly able junior wants
to distinguish himself from a less able junior. As a result, the highly able junior also
has an incentive to attribute too high a weight to his signal (eh > hsh).
To present an equilibrium of this game we need some additional notation. I
denote by m = y the event that the senior monitors and by m = n the event that
the senior does not monitor. Moreover, I denote by Pl the probability that the senior
monitors, Pr (m = yjj) = Pj. Finally, I assume that ej  sj. The implication of
this assumption is that the junior cannot attribute a weight higher than one to his
signal. In this section I limit attention to the equilibrium in which both types of
juniors tend to abstain from consulting. As in the model of the previous section, a
second equilibrium exists in which only the less able junior distorts the consulting
decision (see part B in Proposition 3).
Proposition 4 An equilibrium of the consulting game with monitoring exists in
which:
(i) a junior of type l seeks feedback if sl  sl > sl, where sl solves
Sl (s

l ) =  [1  Pl] ^ (d = n;m = n) , (14)
and Pl = (1  l) 12h (2h  2v).
(ii) a junior of type h consults if sh  sh > sh, where sh solves
Sh (s

h) =  [(1  Ph)P ^ (d = n;m = n) + Ph   ^eh (s <  sh _ s > sh)] ; (15)
and Ph = (1  h) 12h (2h  2v).
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(iii) a junior of type l chooses the treatment el = sl if sl  ~sl =
p
Pl
1 l , and chooses
el = lsl otherwise; ~sl < s

l .
(iv) a junior of type h chooses the treatment eh = sh if sh 
p
Pl
1 l , chooses e

h =
max fhsh; emh g where emh solves
2l s
2
l =  e2h + 2hehsl + (1  l) P (16)
if
p
Pl
1 l < sh < s

l , and chooses e

h = hsh otherwise.
(v) Posteriors: ^

d = n;m = y; s 
p
Pl
(1 l)

= 
^ (d = n;m = y; e = lsl) = 0
^

d = n;m = y; e = maxfem; hshg; s >
p
Pl
(1 l)

= 1
^ (d = n;m = n) =
sh
sh+(1 )sl
^ (sl < s < s

h) = 0.
The posteriors ^ (s <  sh _ s > sh; s = x) and ^ (s <  sh _ s > sh; s 6= x) are given
by (9) and (10), respectively.
Proof. See Appendix
Proposition 4 shows that monitoring has two main e¤ects. First, monitoring leads
to a distortion of the e¤ort decision. The reason for this e¤ect is that without
monitoring the juniors e¤ort is a weighted average of his signal and the expected
di¢ culty of the task with a highly able junior attributing a higher weight to his signal
than a less able junior. Monitoring provides an incentive to a junior to pretend to be
highly able by choosing an e¤ort level that depends to a large extent on his signal.
For low values of sj, the cost of attributing a high weight to ones signal is small. It
does not have a substantial e¤ect on the juniors e¤ort level. As a result, for small
values of sj (sj  ~sl), both less able and highly able juniors base their e¤ort decision
solely on their signals (ej = sj). For larger values of sj, completely ignoring the
possibility that you are wrong is too costly. In expectations, it leads to a too large
mismatch between the e¤ort level and the di¢ culty of the task. Attributing too high
a weight to ones signal is more expensive for a less able junior than for a highly able
junior. The implication is, as in many other signaling games, that when sh > ~sl the
more able junior chooses an e¤ort level that just discourages a less able junior from
mimicking. The above behavior has obvious implications for a juniors reputation
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when the senior monitors. For small values of sj, the juniors e¤ort level and signal
do not provide information on the juniors type. The posterior probability that the
junior is highly able remains . For higher values of sj, the senior learns the juniors
type by monitoring. As discussed in the introduction, the idea that agents too much
emphasize private information is not novel in social sciences. In the psychological
literature, this is one form of overcondence. However, in our model juniors are
not overcondent in the sense that they really believe that they possess superior
information. Juniors pretend to have superior information to signal their ability.10
Second, monitoring directly and indirectly a¤ects the consulting decision. The
direct e¤ect is simple. The incentive for a less able junior not to consult stems from
mimicking a highly able junior. By monitoring the senior may learn the juniors
type. As a result, monitoring weakens a less able juniors incentive not to consult.
The opposite is true for a highly able junior, as such a junior wants the senior to
learn his type. The indirect e¤ects of monitoring on the consulting decision run
through the posterior probabilities. These e¤ects are more complicated. On the one
hand, the direct e¤ect of the possibility of monitoring induces less able juniors to
consult more and more able juniors to consult less. The posterior corresponding to
the event that the senior does not monitor therefore rises. However, if the senior
monitors, he either learns nothing about the juniors reputation or learns his type.
In general, this is good for the reputation of a highly able junior, but bad for a less
able one. Overall, the indirect e¤ects may alleviate or aggravate the distortion in
the consulting decision.
So far in this section I have assumed that f (x) = 1
2h
. As discussed before, the
implication of this assumption is that the consulting decision does not a¤ect the
probability of a complaint. In many situations, a more plausible assumption is that
the consulting decision does a¤ect the probability of a complaint. For example,
suppose that f (x) is a symmetric function with a maximum at x = 0. Then, if
sj is incorrect and the junior does not consult, a higher value of sj increases the
probability that jej   xj > v. Consequently, at the margin not consulting increases
the probability of a complaint. Clearly, in our model less able juniors fear complaints
10Recall that just above Proposition 4, I have assumed that ej  sj . Dropping this assumption
a¤ects equilibrium behaviour for small values of sj . Less able junior will choose el = lsl, and
highly able juniors choose e¤ort in accordance with (16).
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more than highly able juniors. The reason is that for sj > ~sl, investigation of a
complaint reveals the juniors type. From this perspective, a less able junior su¤ers
from a complaint, but a highly able junior benets. The assumption that f (x)
is uniformly distributed is therefore not innocuous. Relaxing it a¤ects a juniors
consulting decision.
The upshot of this section is that monitoring juniors by investigating complaints
as a means of guiding juniorsconsulting decision has an important drawback. It
leads to another distortion. The intuition is clear. Without monitoring, the consult-
ing decision was the only opportunity for a junior to a¤ect his reputation. In Section
3, this led juniors to distort the consulting decision. The problem with monitoring
is that it enables juniors to boost their reputation through the e¤ort decision. In
our model, without monitoring juniors do not distort the e¤ort decision. Private in-
formation is optimally utilized. Monitoring gives incentives to give too much weight
to private information.
5 Conclusion
A physicians job consists of two parts. First, he must make a diagnosis, and second,
he must determine the treatment. In the present paper, I have modeled both tasks
as a matching problem: the treatment should be tailored to the diagnosis. In the
model an incorrect diagnosis usually leads to a mismatch between the treatment and
the disease. I have examined the incentives of residents to consult their supervisors.
I have shown that residents should consult when they assess that the disease is
uncommon. The reason for this nding varies from environment to environment.
In case it is likely that a diagnosis is correct, a resident should consult because
his diagnosis might be incorrect. This would lead to a big mismatch between the
treatment and the disease. By contrast, when the probability of a correct diagnosis
is low, a resident should consult for an uncommon task because he might be correct.
Furthermore, I have shown that reputational concerns may lead to a distortion in
the consulting decision. As highly able residents tend to consult less frequently than
less able residents, consulting damages reputations. Less able residents distort the
consulting decision to a larger extent than highly able residents. Finally, I have
shown that monitoring through investigating complaints about poor treatments has
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an important drawback. It gives incentives to residents to attribute too much weight
on private information.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof consists of four steps. First, I focus on the e¤ort
decision of a less able junior. Second, I discuss the consulting decision of the less
able junior, and show that sl > ~sl. Next, I determine the e¤ort a highly able junior
puts in the task. Finally, I return to the consulting decision of a highly able junior.
The posterior probabilities directly result from the strategies.
6.1 Determination of el
I have to show that if a junior of type l does not consult and sl  ~s = Pl(1 l) ,
then el = sl. The benet of choosing el = sl rather than choosing el = lsl is that
monitoring does not lead to a drop in the juniors reputation. The cost is a distorted
e¤ort decision. At ~s = Pl
(1 l) , the benet is equal to the cost: el = lsl yields a
payo¤:
 l (1  l) s2l   (1  l)2 + [l + (1  l) (1  Pl)]p^ (d = n;m = n)
and el = sl yields:
  (1  l)E (sl   x)2 + [l + (1  l) (1  Pl)]p^ (d = n;m = n) + (1  l) Pl
Equating both expressions and solving for sl yields sl = ~sl =
q
Pl
1 l . As the cost
of el = sl increases in sl while the reputational benets are independent of sl, the
junior chooses el = sl if sl  ~sl.
6.2 The consulting decision of a junior of type l, and ~sl < sl
It is easy to see that given the posterior probabilities Lemma 1 also holds for the
consulting game with monitoring. The implication is that when sj = sl , consulting
damages a juniors reputation in expected terms. Specically, a junior of type l
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consults if sl > sl where s

l solves
Sl (s

l ) =  [1  Pl] ^ (d = n;m = n)
To prove that ~sl < sl , we must show that Sl (~sl)  [1  Pl] ^ (d = n;m = n) < 0 or
l (1  j) ~sl2 + (1  l)2   C    [1  Pl] ^ (d = n;m = n)
= lPl+ (1  l)2   C    [1  Pl] ^ (d = n;m = n) < 0
(where I have used that ~s2l =
Pl
1 l ). The expression (1  j)2   C is by as-
sumption smaller than zero. Moreover, as ^ (d = n;m = n) > , it su¢ ces to show
that lPl   (1  Pl) < 0. Pl = (1  l) 12h (2h  2v) implying lPl   (1  Pl) =
(1  2l ) 12h (2h  2v)  1 < 0, which is always true.
6.3 Determinaton of eh
If sl  ~sl, a junior of type h cannot distinguish himself from a low ability type. A
plausible out of equilibrium belief is: ^ (sj  ~sl; ej < jsj) = 0. Then, eh = sh.
Now suppose sl > ~sl. Then a junior of type h can distinguish himself by choosing
an e¤ort level a junior of type l does not want to mimic. Choosing el = lsl yields
a payo¤ to a junior of type l equal to
 l (1  l) s2l   (1  l)2 + [l + (1  l) (1  Pl)]p^ (d = n;m = n)
Choosing el = eh would yield
  (eh   sl)2   (1  )E (eh   x)2 + [l + (1  l) (1  Pl)]p^ (d = n;m = n)
+ (1  l) Pl
Equating the above equation yields
2l s
2
l =  e2h + 2hehsl + (1  l) P
By choosing the e¤ort level that solves this equation (emh ), a junior of type h distin-
guish himself from a junior of type l. Of course, if hsh > emh , the junior of type h
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chooses eh = hsh. Hence, for sh > ~sl, ej = maxfem; hshg.
6.4 The consulting decision of a junior of type h
Equating the payo¤ to the senior when consulting and not consulting yields:
Sh (s

h) =  [(1  Ph)P ^ (d = n;m = n) + Ph   ^eh (s <  sh _ s > sh)]
as in Proposition 4.
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